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Abstract 
The Global Goals adopted in 2015 are the next phase in the UN’s plans to tackle poverty and the 
systemic causes of under-development and other global problems. As with the previous Millennium 
Development Goals, the Global Goals are expressly political in nature. This paper considers the 
function, status and role of international law in global development and, in particular, how the Global 
Goals might be perceived in legal terms. The paper rejects the argument that they represent customary 
law due to weaknesses in State practice and opinio juris, and is unpersuaded that it is helpful to 
categorise them as soft law as their purpose is aspirational and not regulatory. Thus, the Goals exist in 
an arena of contested legality. Two “re-imaginings” of international law are proposed; first, by 
connecting them to the non-binding Maastricht Principles on the Extraterritorial Obligations of States 
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and secondly, by linking them to ideas of 
international solidarity. The paper concludes that neither provides easy solutions. Nevertheless, what 
both do – in their own way – is to force us to question why international law isn’t viewed as an 
acceptable conduit for the advancement of global development? 
 
---------------- 
‘…development is a mutually beneficial concept. The objective is to raise the tides and lift all 
boats. International law, with its unique structure and binding language, represents the levies, 
docks and canal works, channelling the waters and ensuring access and fair play for all involved.’1 
 
1. Introduction 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – more 
commonly known as the “Global Goals” – in September 20152 to run from 2016-2030, as the successor 
to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were to expire at the end of that year. The MDGs 
had, to some extent, and in some quarters, been a surprising success, certainly when contrasted against 
the low expectations many had placed in previous attempts by the UN to promote and support global 
development programmes and opportunities. The hope is that despite their differences – discussed in 
more detail below – the Global Goals will again resonate with (and within) the international community 
towards proactive and progressive implementation. 
From the perspective of international law, however, the Global Goals – as with the MDGs – remain 
conceptually and programmatically indeterminate. Eschewing formal legal conceptualisation, the 
Global Goals remain outside the framework of normative rules and international legal processes. 
Though embedded and finding expression within the work-plans and strategies of the UN and other 
global and regional bodies (as well as non-governmental organisations), the Global Goals are not only 
explicitly political they are, more specifically and overtly, non-legal. While one might make a case to 
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argue international organisations (especially those within the UN system) are required to act to support 
the Goals, the commitment of States towards them is much more difficult to categorise.  
Whether the Goals might separately be construed as “soft law” is invariably part of the discourse, but 
that only takes us so far, as soft law often – and I would argue invariably – presupposes some movement 
of travel towards a level of bindingness, and it is unclear whether that it is even relevant in this context. 
What this paper therefore seeks to consider are certain broader normative questions; should the Global 
Goals be re-imagined as international law, what that might look like and how might that be distinct 
from what exists now? Two putative routes are considered; namely the recently proposed (non-binding) 
Maastricht Principles on the Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the ongoing work of the Independent Expert on Human Rights and International 
Solidarity. Though there are genuine questions as to whether clearer normativity would make objectives 
such as the Global Goals more, or less, effective – many suspect the latter – there is perhaps a broader, 
more overarching, question of why shouldn’t they be binding? Why isn’t international law viewed as 
an acceptable conduit and process for advancement of global development priorities? Placing the 
quotation at the beginning into a question, is international law part of the international toolkit to ‘raise 
the tides and lift all boats’? 
 
2. Development, the MDGs and the Global Goals – False Starts and Winning Formulas? 
The United Nations has international development as one of its core purposes, building on article 1(3) 
of the Charter, which recognises the Organisation’s pivotal role ‘in solving international problems of 
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character’. The Economic and Social Council, in 
particular, was established within the United Nations to promote and coordinate institutional action and 
intergovernmental discussion on, inter alia, development. Amongst the bodies and programmes 
established by States, or through the UN, over the years to consider these issues include the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), UNICEF (UN Children’s Fund), and UNESCO (UN Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization). Overseeing all of this is the General Assembly. In addition, the Bretton Woods 
institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, somewhat later in 
development, the World Trade Organization (WTO) – connected to but outside the UN family of 
institutions – play key, if invariably controversial, roles in both the operational and strategic approach 
of the global effort towards tackling poverty and underdevelopment. Thus, despite or because of best 
efforts, institutional fragmentation and strategic in-fighting between institutions has always been a well-
recognised feature of global development policy.3  
It would prove moot to seek to elaborate on the variety of understandings and definitions of 
development provided over the years and the extent to which these interpretations say more about the 
internal politics of the authoring institution than the issue itself. Indeed, such definitions determine the 
parameters of the debate; perhaps no more evident than when development shifted in the middle 1980s 
onto new ground to incorporate an environmental dimension within the concept of sustainable 
development4 to then shift further into more holistic understandings of social and human development, 
and human security.5 And though much work has been done on bringing different interpretations 
together – largely down to the collaborative work around the MDGs – differences in focus and tone 
remain. So, for instance, whereas the present mission of the World Bank is to ‘end extreme poverty 
within a generation and boost shared prosperity’6 and that of the UNDP is not dissimilar (‘Helping 
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countries to achieve the simultaneous eradication of poverty and significant reduction of inequalities 
and exclusion’7), this is not to ignore the much broader perspective of development endorsed by the 
General Assembly itself: 
Sustainable development recognizes that eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, 
combating inequality within and among countries, preserving the planet, creating sustained, 
inclusive and sustainable economic growth and fostering social inclusion are linked to each other 
and are interdependent.8 
Such understandings are, of course, far from being irreconcilable or mutually exclusive (and both the 
World Bank and the UNDP also endorse broader approaches to development to include environmental 
sustainability and social inclusion), but such differences in wording do nevertheless reveal a broader, 
and deeper, complexity; how to connect (and embed synergies between) the overarching objectives of 
poverty reduction and development promotion within particular institutional mandates and actions.  
It is thus unsurprising that over the decades, the UN (both as an institution per se and as a forum for its 
members) has sought various means by which to tackle development, often in quite disparate ways. 
They have ranged from the adoption of so-called “decades of development”9 (the term itself suggesting 
both the long-term endeavour of the mission and the frustration as one decade of development slipped 
into the next), the concerted (if acrimonious) attempt by the Global South to establish a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO),10 through to now a seeming consensus around headline targets 
and measurable indicators. Simultaneously, the Bretton Woods institutions have evolved;11 moving 
away from the dogmatic Washington Consensus of the 1980s, which represented a strategy and practice 
often at odds with the vision of the majority of its own developing country membership of the UN. This 
is a long, and often-repeated, story of global international development, of the imposition of neo-
liberalism, tied aid and interference with host States. It has often been a story of international rhetoric 
yet substantive inactivity (or worse, ineffective activity) on development policy and praxis; of the 
paradox of emotive words combined with the absence of long-term strategy and consequently positive 
outcomes. The success that was achieved was often low-level, and the results of macro-projects funded 
through organizations such as the World Bank seemed hopelessly random, with huge social negative 
externalities often being as prominent as the benefits of such programmes.12 
Also absent, from the perspective of the international lawyer, was any form of serious international 
legal engagement in such matters; the Bretton Woods institutions, for instance, have always sought to 
place their own activities within tightly-woven (and, as importantly, internal) systems of rules and 
processes, with as little scrutiny from external review – or general international law – as possible. The 
quid pro quo offered was that such institutions did not seek to intervene in the internal political affairs 
of the States in which they operated; the economic rationale of their mandate being a purely technocratic 
one. Change has come, but it often seems grudging and determined by – and at the pace of – the 
institutions themselves.  
The governance of international trade has equally struggled with balancing the reciprocity of trade 
commitments with ensuring special and differential treatment for developing countries. The most recent 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in December 2015 revealed a stark realism as to how far long-
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held hopes for the Doha “development” trade round were no longer driving its agenda,13 in contrast to 
the fine words of previous meetings, and even as recently as September of the same year.14 Regional 
and pan-regional trading blocs and preferential trade and investment agreements are becoming the 
increasingly dominant form of intergovernmental agreement,15 raising not only the question as to the 
raison d’être of the WTO but fundamentally risking the objective of balanced development in trade 
negotiations.  
Similarly, despite decades since the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the 
1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
human rights law remains stubbornly outside the mainstream of development policy and operational 
activity.16 As the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Professor Philip Alston, 
noted in a damning 2015 report: 
For most purposes, the World Bank is a human rights-free zone. In its operational policies, in 
particular, it treats human rights more like an infectious disease than universal values and 
obligations. The biggest single obstacle to moving towards an appropriate approach is the 
anachronistic and inconsistent interpretation of the “political prohibition” contained in its Articles 
of Agreement. As a result, the Bank is unable to engage meaningfully with the international 
human rights framework, or to assist its member countries in complying with their own human 
rights obligations.17 
This might, of course, be as much the fault of those with responsibility for the advancement of human 
rights as it is with those with a similar responsibility for development (a point Alston has also had the 
opportunity to make18), but nonetheless normative and institutional barriers as to who is responsible for 
what have proved incredibly difficult to breakdown. The 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development19 - imperfect as it was – is thus perhaps not so much as anomaly in this area, as a missed 
opportunity for the General Assembly to take overall strategic responsibility for this issue. 
Moreover, international aid (‘official development assistance’ (ODA)) and the “obligation” to bestow 
it remains outside the purview of international law. Political commitment to ODA has never found legal 
expression, though certain States have committed themselves to it within domestic law.20 The extent to 
which solidarity and positive cooperation in the field of development have consistently failed to be the 
subject of normative explanation is mirrored only by the reality that globalising pressures and private 
resource often makes such public provision, however essential, of secondary importance. 
For the international lawyer, overarching this is a realisation that the role of international law in 
development has traditionally been limited and nuanced. Not just that, but there is little sense of 
progression; of the gradual evolution of State practice and opinio juris that constitutes customary rules 
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on international development. As noted above, the NIEO was unduly partisan in nature and rejected 
with suspicion by developed States as one-sided, regardless of the existence or otherwise of any specific 
merits. Ultimately, it failed under the weight of its own expectations and the lack of political 
engagement by the United States and the European north. Various attempts have been made to identify 
and progressively develop legal rules that might frame a broader normative understanding of 
development – devised often at a non-governmental level21 – but such arguments remain at best 
aspirational and perhaps, more notably, marginalised. The traditional response is that developed States 
will not provide assistance through compulsion; voluntarism is the best form of self-interest. 
It was in this context that the General Assembly adopted the 2000 Millennium Declaration, including 
what subsequently became the Millennium Development Goals.22 The eight MDGs were headline 
targets that it was hoped the international community of States, multilateral agencies and NGOs would 
coalesce around. Perhaps most prominently were the targets reducing extreme poverty by half, reducing 
child mortality of the under-fives by two-thirds and ensuring universal primary education for all. 
Though not without criticism,23 sometimes strident, the MDGs have surpassed the relatively low 
expectations many had for them. In part, this was because the MDGs were both strategic yet not unduly 
prescriptive, two faults previously seen in global development policy. As the UN Secretary General 
notes in his foreword to the 2015 Millennium Development Goals Report, worth quoting at length:  
The global mobilization behind the Millennium Development Goals has produced the most 
successful anti-poverty movement in history. The landmark commitment entered into by world 
leaders in the year 2000—to “spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from 
the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty”—was translated into an inspiring 
framework of eight goals and, then, into wide-ranging practical steps that have enabled people 
across the world to improve their lives and their future prospects. The MDGs helped to lift more 
than one billion people out of extreme poverty, to make inroads against hunger, to enable more 
girls to attend school than ever before and to protect our planet. They generated new and 
innovative partnerships, galvanized public opinion and showed the immense value of setting 
ambitious goals. By putting people and their immediate needs at the forefront, the MDGs 
reshaped decision-making in developed and developing countries alike.24 
A high degree of rhetoric, and in danger of transcending into hubris, but there is also a not insignificant 
element of truth. The MDGs have achieved results. As Bill Gates famously said, they were a ‘report 
card that helps us judge our performance’.25 It was in this spirit that the international community 
endorsed in 2012 at the Conference on Sustainable Development (the so-called Rio +20 summit) the 
beginnings of the work on the next stage. Noticeably, whereas the MDGs had been crafted privately by 
“experts” within the United Nations, the Sustainable Development Goals (as the Global Goals were 
initially called) were to be the subject of a two year consultative process, involving both States and non-
governmental organisations.26 This process – which, at times, risked becoming subject to the usual 
global problem of high expectations, and low achievement – emerged into the glare of media and 
political attention in late summer 2015, just prior to, and then during, the UN summit of world leaders.  
Of particular concern had been that the Global Goals would become an unmanageable list of such wide-
ranging, yet worthy, objectives that they would be incapable of either sensible implementation or of 
meaningful cross-cutting connectivity. To take one example, returned to later, there was a significant 
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push by a broad group of organisations and agencies to include culture within the Global Goals, it being 
noted that the MDGs were noticeably absent in this regard. In and of itself, how could this be objected 
to? As the Declaration for the Inclusion of Culture states, ‘We believe that culture is both a driver and 
enabler of sustainable development and that the explicit inclusion of targets and indicators for culture 
in the Sustainable Development Goals will enable transformative change’.27 Surely it would not be 
wrong to recognise both the generic role of culture in this regard or, indeed, the contributions that 
different cultures make, thus ensuring critical engagement with different societies, groups and the 
under-represented in the Goals? Others worried that the simplicity and effectiveness of referencing only 
headline targets would be lost by seeking to be all-inclusive, of incorporating all interests and many 
agendas. Such examples of what to include (and to omit) were myriad and cross-cutting, but they often 
had one thing in common; a fear (real or imaginary) of what exclusion would mean. To return to the 
above declaration: ‘If culture is not mentioned, it will be extremely difficult for countries to elaborate 
policies and provide funds for projects that rely on culture's role as a driver and an enabler of sustainable 
development’. 
 
3. Global Goals: What’s Lost in All that is Included? 
Ultimately what transpired in Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development,28 the ‘outcome document’ of the summit – interesting language itself for an organisation 
that often likes to see things in terms of declarations – is a balance between what was wanted and what 
many feared. The Global Goals comprise 17 goals, 169 associated targets and more than 300 indicators 
of progress. Whether it was the scale of the global ambition required to achieve such various objectives 
or the spread that such objectives cover that justified the change in name from Sustainable Development 
Goals to Global Goals is not clear, though their remit is invariably more expansive than the MDGs. As 
the Outcome Document reflects:  
[t]his is an Agenda of unprecedented scope and significance. It is accepted by all countries and 
is applicable to all, taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of 
development and respecting national policies and priorities. These are universal goals and targets 
which involve the entire world, developed and developing countries alike.29 
Moreover, the Global Goals selected range significantly beyond the development priorities of the past 
– reducing poverty, mortality, hunger etc – but expressly sought to tackle a broader panoply of issues; 
arguably to include much more systematically the underlying and systemic causes of unsustainable 
development, as broadly conceived. Perhaps more noticeably still – and as indicated by the above 
quotation – is the reach of the Global Goals. Whereas the MDGs were primarily objectives of the 
international community for the global South, the Global Goals are objectives both of, and for, the 
international community more generally. As has been noted, if with some over-generalisation: ‘Poorer 
countries need to make the delivery of basic services such as health and education to all their citizens 
the priorities; emerging economies need to ensure safety and protect human rights; richer countries need 
to face up to the problems of affluence, such as obesity, and work on building tolerant societies; 
everyone has a long way to go on environmental sustainability’.30 
It might be useful at this point to list the 17 Global Goals: 1) to end poverty in all its forms everywhere; 
2) to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture; 3) 
to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; 4) to ensure inclusive and equitable 
quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all; 5) to achieve gender equality and 
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empower all women and girls; 6) to ensure availability and sustainable management of water and 
sanitation for all; 7) to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; 8) 
to promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and 
decent work for all; 9) to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization and foster innovation; 10) to reduce inequality within and among countries; 11) to 
make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable; 12) to ensure sustainable 
consumption and production patterns; 13) to take urgent action to combat climate change and its 
impacts; 14) to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable 
development; 15) to protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably 
manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss; 
16) to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice 
for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels; and 17) to strengthen the 
means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. 
By anyone’s reckoning, this is a significant list of goals. Whether they are sufficiently coherent and 
memorable to capture – and retain – global attention only time will tell. For critics, it is a shopping-list 
of idealism that reveals a chasm of political realism in the workings of the United Nations; a utopian 
view of what international bureaucracy can achieve.31 For others, their principal fault will lie with not 
being ambitious enough. There are fault-lines everywhere; too much or too little State intervention 
required; too much or too little focus on private investment; and too much or too little attempt to connect 
the various thematic issues. And so one might go on.  
Unlike the MDGs, there are some notable additions, recognising not only the clearer environmental foci 
of some of the goals (eg Goals 13-15) but also the more societally-transformative nature of some of the 
others (eg Goals 4, 5, 10 and 11). Moreover, unlike the MDGs, which were largely macro-targets 
achievable as much through national economic growth as national policy-making, many of the Global 
Goals will not be so easily reconciled with, or achieved through, a growth-alone approach to 
development. Targets around gender equality, biodiversity loss and access to justice (to name but three) 
will require clear, principled and overt strategic intervention and coordinated policies and partnerships. 
Growth alone with not solve these social issues; in fact, growth without well-considered public policies 
might make them more difficult to progress. 
Nevertheless, a significant issue around all of the Goals is the scale of financial commitment required 
to ensure their effective implementation. Most assessments have indicated a commitment of several 
trillion US dollars per annum across domestic, international and private resources to turn the Goals into 
reality. The 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda for Financing for Development,32 adopted before the 
Goals themselves, set out a plan (of sorts) to begin mobilising such resource though compromises and 
disagreements abounded on international tax reform, the clamping down on illicit financial flows and 
ensuring more equitable distribution of official (never mind private) investment within the global South. 
This document, like many before it, is replete with many of the right words but, in truth, resource (and 
action) rarely follows to the same extent.  
It is perhaps pertinent here to pause and note the role (and absence) of law in not only achieving the 
Goals per se (something which is returned to) but also around the achievement of financing to support 
it. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda envisages law, to the extent that it is mentioned at all, as something 
akin to background fact, as an immovable framework that future programmes and initiatives must work 
within, as providing “rules of the game” but where the game itself remains unquestioned. Often it seems 
that there is little recognition that international law is created by the very States that are also negotiating 
how to resolve contemporary global challenges. Rarely are global rules considered enabling or 
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sufficiently capable of transformative action to prompt or cause fundamental reform.33 Law is thus both 
supremely important, yet contemporaneously viewed as marginal in relevance to global development.34  
Two examples perhaps suffice. On the taxation of multinationals, for instance, the ability to change (or 
even strengthen) the law is hardly acknowledged; rather, law is seen as a restraint on the regulatory 
behaviour of any one State, so that it conducts its affairs ‘in accordance with national and international 
laws and policies’.35 No reference here to the weaknesses in, or limitations of, the present state of the 
law. The contested and evolving nature of international agreements gives way to a fixed sense of 
normativity, in which the fundamental precepts are removed from, and not part of, the discourse. 
Secondly, as regards sovereign debt – a hugely controversial issue – the wording of the document is 
even more instructive. 
…We encourage countries, particularly those issuing bonds under foreign law, to take further 
actions to include [collective action] clauses in all their bond issuance. We also welcome 
provision of financial support for legal assistance to least developed countries and commit to 
boosting international support for advisory legal services. We will explore enhanced international 
monitoring of litigation by creditors after debt restructuring. 
We note the increased issuance of sovereign bonds in domestic currency under national laws, and 
the possibility of countries voluntarily strengthening domestic legislation to reflect guiding 
principles for effective, timely, orderly and fair resolution of sovereign debt crises.36 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider these issues in anything like the detail they require and 
deserve.37 Merely to note at this stage the passive role given to (domestic public) law (as well as the 
non-existence of international law); certainly in contrast to the primacy given to the assurance of 
contractual undertakings. To the extent that predatory behaviour of creditors is perceived as a problem, 
the extent of action is an exploration of future monitoring of litigation practices and patterns. The 
protection bestowed upon least developed countries is singularly apparent; it is restricted to legal 
assistance and advice. This is, of course, not to suggest that such initiatives are not constructive and 
helpful but rather the point is more generic; law as a tool of change is rarely part of the equation. Law 
is a given, a constraint or, where change is mooted, voluntary and soft. To change the structure, the law 
– the “rules of the game” themselves – is often viewed as a return to the partisan, and divisive, days of 
the New International Economic Order. Nevertheless, as Salomon pertinently notes,  
It would seem we need to turn our attention from the poor to the rich, from the victims to the 
beneficiaries, because it is only by addressing the apparatuses that sustain world privilege that 
we can understand and hope to confront the mechanisms that maintain world poverty. The 
adoption and enforcement of legal regimes have, and will continue to play, a critical role in this 
process.38 
                                                          
33 Moreover, as the former on UN Special Representative on Human Rights and Business Enterprises notes, 
traditional international legal norms are inapplicable directly to private enterprises (Ruggie (2006), para. 64: 
‘None of these changes, however, support the claim on which the Norms rest: that international law has 
transformed to the point where it can be said that the broad array of international human rights attach direct legal 
obligations to corporations, a claim that has generated the most doubt and contestation’). Of course, the Norms 
referred to were the controversial Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (2003).  
34 This should not however ignore the role of private law in development (see, for instance, Rühmkorf (2015)). 
35 UN (2015), para. 23. 
36 UN (2015), paras. 100-101. 
37 IMF (2014). 
38 Salomon (2008), pp. 72-73. 
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To thus return to the Global Goals themselves; the absence of law (broadly conceived) is not accidental, 
but is a clear and explicit attempt to de-legalise the targets.  
The next part of this paper will consider some of the consequences that flow from this, and seek to re-
imagine alternative scenarios. But it is important to note the chasm between the rhetoric and some very 
obvious omissions, most notably around human rights. As has been widely remarked upon, despite the 
increasing attempt to couple business, development and human rights in recent years,39 the Global Goals 
are reflective of the MDGs in overtly failing to utilise human rights, and human rights language, in the 
text of their wording. Notwithstanding the universalism of human rights, the Global Goals are singularly 
shorn of their human rights implications, beyond the barest of references.40 Putting to one side for the 
moment the myriad of interconnections between the Goals and economic, social and cultural rights (and 
indeed certain civil and political rights41), even as regards those Goals where it would seem almost 
impossible not to place the relevant Goal within its associated human rights framework, there is nothing.  
Take, for instance, gender equality; much was made of how the Global Goals were a fundamental jump-
forward in development policy (vis-à-vis the MDGs) on gender issues.42 Despite this, there are no 
express references to human rights generally or, more specifically, the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. Similarly, despite the advances in recent 
years, references to non-discrimination still exclude LGBT considerations,43 primarily at the insistence 
of various religiously-conservative States. Thus, to this extent, the Global Goals are a product and a 
representation of a conflicted international community as it both seeks to portray itself and, in reality, 
how it is.  
It is thus both surprising (and simultaneously not surprising) to hear the UN Secretary General at the 
Human Rights Council in 2016 to say ‘[t]he 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is a major step 
forward for human rights…. The integrated, indivisible and universal nature of the 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals is deeply rooted in universal human rights’.44 In a quixotic sense, the Global Goals 
are a manifestation of where human dignity leads, and what it obliges. But equally, as Alston noted so 
forcibly as regards the MDGs, ‘language as well as context is important. The language of human rights 
cannot be systematically ignored if claims of human rights friendliness are to be accepted at face 
value’.45 A similar argument could be made as regards the Global Goals; indeed, the international 
community does not seem to have moved on in the over fifteen years since the inception of the MDGs.  
 
4. The Global Goals and/as international law: hard, soft or re-imagined? 
Transforming Our World is a paradoxical document when it comes to international law. On the one 
hand, it makes mention of – and with suitable deference to – international law.  
We will implement the Agenda for the full benefit of all, for today’s generation and for future 
generations. In doing so, we reaffirm our commitment to international law and emphasize that 
                                                          
39 UN (2011). 
40 UNGA (2015), para. 19: ‘We reaffirm the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well 
as other international instruments relating to human rights and international law. We emphasize the 
responsibilities of all States, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to respect, protect and promote 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all…’. 
41 For instance, Global Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, which includes targets on violence and 
violence-related deaths, trafficking and torture of children, guaranteeing birth registration, and access to justice. 
42 Vogelstein (2015). 
43 http://www.stonewall.org.uk/sites/default/files/sdg-guide_2.pdf  
44 http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=2946#.VzWxck10zIU  
45 Alston (2005), p. 826. 
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the Agenda is to be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the rights and obligations of 
States under international law.46 
This is one amongst a number of statements ‘reaffirm[ing]’, or highlighting that the Goals are ‘guided 
by’ or ‘grounded in’, international law or, more occasionally, certain named legal instruments.47 But, 
as was noted above, a reference such as ‘in a manner that is consistent with’ both constrains as well as 
enables. It frames the available policy space without challenging the underlying structures. It is a phrase 
often used to deny or to discourage unilateralism, be that progressive or regressive in nature. It both 
provides continuity and assurance and, however implicitly, often a promise; a promise not to disturb 
the status quo. Development, if it is to occur, does so through a set pattern; characterised more often 
than not by aspirational yet self-interested voluntarism of the North, soft nudging of private enterprise 
and for the global South to follow certain demarcated policy pathways. 
It is thus not surprising that the Global Goals are inherently political in nature; in the words of the 
document they are ‘aspirational and global’, thus it is left to each individual country to ‘set[…] its own 
national targets guided by the global level of ambition but taking into account national circumstances’.48 
If there were any emerging view that the MDGs (limited as they were in number) were reflective of 
putative customary law (and even as far back as 2005, Alston was prepared to go so far as to say that 
‘it can be observed that the case would be most easily made in relation to the first six of the Goals’49) it 
is difficult how the same could be said of the more numerous, and perhaps more disparate, Global Goals. 
Indeed, one of the criticisms of (some of) the goals is that they have lost much of the descriptive-cum-
moral appeal in their attempt to be more inclusive.  
How might one, for instance, understand, communicate, as well as reconcile, the various elements of 
Global Goal 9 (“To build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization 
and foster innovation”)? The International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
noted that for something to be a rule of custom, it had to be of a ‘fundamentally norm-creating 
character’.50 While one might debate the extent of the State practice and opinio juris surrounding many 
of the MDGs, there was often at least a clarity of aim and purpose. It is less simply stated in respect of 
many of the Global Goals. To take Global Goal 9; what makes infrastructure ‘resilient’ or 
industrialization ‘inclusive and sustainable’?  
And as regards those goals where the language would seem to at least allow for the possibility of greater 
normativity, at least at the “headline” level (eg Global Goals 14 and 15 on the conservation of maritime 
and terrestrial ecosystems), it would seem to be just that; a possibility. The Global Goals neither add to, 
nor detract, from broader debates on the customary status of environmental norms. Their inclusion as 
Global Goals may signal political importance in tackling the issues – heralded now not only as 
significant in and of themselves but as causes of poverty and underdevelopment – but the overt lack of 
legal commitment contained therein means they are a long way removed from indicating any extension 
of pre-existing normative obligations. 
Some might point to the Goals to suggest a form of soft law being in evidence. For sure, not binding; 
but not completely optional either. If soft law as a workable concept is viewed as a means of 
incorporating objectives for States to work towards (and concurrently voluntary constraints upon 
discretionary State conduct) in a similar manner to, but distinct from, binding law,51 do not the Global 
Goals have a similar effect? If one were to consider the monitoring and review mechanisms that 
                                                          
46 UNGA (2015), para. 18. 
47 Instruments mentioned include the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 2003 World Health 
Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. 
48 UNGA (2015), para. 55. 
49 Alston (2005), p. 774. 
50 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) ICJ Rep 42. 
51 Boyle and Chinkin (2007), pp. 211-229. 
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developed around the MDGs,52 with not dissimilar (with some hope stronger) processes to be 
established for the Global Goals, might not one see resonance with other soft law commitments? The 
level of accountability may fall short of that established by some international instruments – be that the 
reporting requirements under human rights law, the inspection/monitoring processes under such diverse 
regimes as anti-nuclear proliferation and certain environmental regimes, or the capacity of investor-
state resolution under bilateral investment treaties (to name but three “types”) – but soft law 
accountability by its very nature is often achieved as much through (the threat of) collective pressure as 
it is by formal scrutiny. Thus, when Transforming Our World talks of a ‘robust, voluntary, effective, 
participatory, transparent and integrated follow-up and review framework will make a vital contribution 
to implementation’53 – a key part of which will be undertaken by the already established High-Level 
Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF)54 – surely it is not that different to how other soft 
law processes operate?  
But notwithstanding the appearance of soft law, there is a significant stumbling block in the 
nomenclature of soft law in this instance. Soft law is not simply a non-binding way to achieve targets 
and to improve accountability, there is also something invariably iterative and transitional about soft 
law; it often requires a sense of movement towards, or at a least a contribution to, formal legality. As 
Boyle and Chinkin note, ‘[s]oft law is a multi-faceted concept, whose relationship to treaties, custom 
and general principles is both subtle and diverse. At its simplest soft law facilitates progressive 
evolution of international law’.55 For instance, the development of soft codes of conduct that can be 
used as evidence of meeting a State’s international obligations in international trade law, or litigating 
(for or against the use of) soft law principles in international courts and tribunals as nascent principles 
of customary law, or utilising soft law instruments hoping that confidence will build to garner sufficient 
state endorsement to move to a legally binding agreement. Soft law may fall outside traditional 
descriptors of what is legally binding, but there is nevertheless an intention, however implicit, to 
regulate in the absence of law. 
With the Global Goals, any contribution to formal legality, and any intention to regulate, is almost 
wholly missing. There are two quite contrary reasons for this. First, the rhetoric. The purpose of the 
Goals is – for want of a better phrase – to achieve the common good; they are neither prescriptive and 
regulatory (as much of soft law is) nor is there any obvious intention of moving towards such 
prescription and regulation. The numerous targets and indicators are certainly measurable (and thus 
there is a semblance of commonality between the Global Goals and soft law types) but the end-purpose 
is too idealised and idealistic to be captured by limited models of governance and regulation that soft 
law often acts as a proxy for. As Transforming Our World prosaically states 
In its scope, however, the framework we are announcing today goes far beyond the Millennium 
Development Goals. Alongside continuing development priorities such as poverty eradication, 
health, education and food security and nutrition, it sets out a wide range of economic, social and 
environmental objectives. It also promises more peaceful and inclusive societies.56 
A second argument against soft law sits behind this, and is much more critical in nature. It is 
recognition that such Goals are not established to challenge the international community, but rather 
                                                          
52 For general information see Millennium Development Goals Indicators, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/About.htm. 
53 UNGA (2015), para. 72. 
54 The modalities for which were set out in UN A/RES/67/290 (2013), notably: ‘that the high-level political forum, 
consistent with its universal intergovernmental character, shall provide political leadership, guidance and 
recommendations for sustainable development, follow up and review progress in the implementation of 
sustainable development commitments‘ (para. 2). 
55 Boyle and Chinkin (2007), p. 229. 
56 UNGA (2015), para. 17. 
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to make a ‘rhetorical commitment’57 for change. As Salomon comments as regards the MDGs, but 
the critique could – until contradicted – be held equally against the Global Goals: ‘[t]he Goals were 
not set up to address the structural conditions antagonistic to their achievement and they are now 
serving to advance the economic interests of wealthy states even under the guise of the 
humanitarianism of addressing world poverty’.58 In short, the Goals are neither soft nor binding law 
not only because of the aspiration of their idealism but because of the politics of their construction 
and implementation. In short, to the extent that soft law merely foreshadows binding law, its 
application to the Global Goals is equally problematic. 
But if the Global Goals were to be viewed, and were to be constructed, as legal norms, how might things 
look different? It is important to recognise that despite the mainstream rejection of legality, there is 
nevertheless a strongly held viewpoint prepared to acknowledge wider normative obligations on States 
in this area. This is achieved primarily by recognising, and giving meaningful effect, to the wording of 
such texts as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, article 2(1) of which 
requires all States Parties ‘to take steps, individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation, especially economic and technical , to the maximum of its available resources, with a view 
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures’. This received further 
elaboration by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right’s in which it was said 
The Committee wishes to emphasize that in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, with well-established principles of international law, and with the provisions 
of the Covenant itself, international cooperation for development and thus for the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States. It is particularly incumbent 
upon those States which are in a position to assist others in this regard.59 
Alston talked similarly in the midst of the MDGs of the emergence of an ‘internationalization of 
responsibility’.60 Nevertheless, whilst acknowledging the MDGs had the potential to change the tone of 
the debate, he was circumspect as to the likelihood, recognising that there is little practice, never mind 
consensus, to support the ‘proposition that any given country is obligated to provide specific assistance 
to any other country’.61 Of particular importance in this regard, but in equal measure controversial, was 
MDG 8, which required the elaboration of a global partnership for development. But again, the extent 
to which any such partnership between States and presumably other international actors could evolve 
from the cooperative to a level of compulsion is deeply problematic when viewed from both what States 
have said, and how they have historically agreed to work, on development. 
Thus, we remain in the area of contested and putative legality. As de Serpa Soares notes, ‘a major 
opportunity also exists for international law to engage at the conceptual heart of the matter’.62 Though 
he does not do so, I want to propose two “re-imaginings”; neither of which are that far removed from 
mainstream international law, but are nevertheless sufficiently distant from the present consensus to be 
worth creative consideration. The first is the work on the non-binding Maastricht Principles on the 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and secondly, 
is the work of the Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity. These are mere 
examples of where such normative arguments could in the future lead.63 
                                                          
57 Salomon (2008) p. 57. 
58 Idem. 
59 CESCR (1990), para. 14. 
60 Alston (2005), p. 775. 
61 Alston (2005), p. 777. 
62 de Serpa Soares (2015), p. 5. 
63 Note also de Serpa Soares himself who considers the institutional framework of international organisations as 
a key area for “growth” in international law, arguing that ‘international law would help to ensure that development 
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4.1. Maastricht Principles on the Extraterritorial Obligations of State 
The debate on respecting, protecting and fulfilling economic, social and cultural rights has been taken 
forward in a most interesting direction in recent years with the work of a group of experts in their 
personal capacity, leading to the 2011 Maastricht Principles on the Extraterritorial Obligations of States 
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.64 Such principles build on other attempts, both 
within the Covenant system and elsewhere, to strengthen the implementation of such rights.65 Key to 
the Principles is the conviction that States ‘have repeatedly committed themselves to realizing the 
economic, social and cultural rights of everyone. This [is a] solemn commitment’.66 There is insufficient 
space to outline in depth the Maastricht Principles in this paper, and the reader is encouraged to explore 
the Commentaries to the Principles. Nevertheless, certain of the fundamental propositions can be clearly 
outlined.  
First, is the scope of jurisdiction, which is at the heart of the extraterritorial extension of duties owed to 
such rights. Relying on the jurisprudence of the International Court – if arguably not always directly on 
point – the Principles seek to demarcate the extraterritorial circumstances as to when a State may be 
under an obligation to secure socio-economic rights. As set down in Principle 9, quoted below: 
Principle 9: Scope of Jurisdiction 
A State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural rights in any 
of the following: 
a) situations over which it exercises authority or effective control, whether or not such control is 
exercised in accordance with international law; 
b) situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural rights, whether within or outside its territory; 
c) situations in which the State, acting separately or jointly, whether through its executive, 
legislative or judicial branches, is in a position to exercise decisive influence or to take measures 
to realize economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially, in accordance with international 
law. 
Needless to say, while the Commentaries make every effort to substantiate the existence of such 
bases of jurisdiction, such circumstances are not without controversy. Even circumstance (a) (where 
a state ‘exercises authority or effective control’), though this has been the subject of significant case 
law in recent years, and while it can be argued convincingly that in such a situation a State has 
obligations to respect and protect all rights, even here, most of the case law relied on is notably in 
the field of civil and political rights.67  
Unsurprisingly, moving onto circumstances (b) and (c), these are much more contested. For instance, 
circumstance (b) applies to ‘situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable 
effects’. While the Commentaries seek to rule out any outlandlish or unworkable application of the 
                                                          
commitments are fulfilled by establishing institutions with mandates to assess compliance and generally-accepted 
set of criteria. Through such steps, international development law could move from the general and the technical 
to the operational – helping to fulfil the transformative development agenda’ (de Serpa Soares (2015), p. 12). 
64 For the Principles and the Commentaries, see De Schutter, Eide, Khalfan, Orellana, Salomon, and Seiderman 
(2012) (hereinafter referred to as De Schutter et al.). 
65 For instance, the 1987 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (UN Doc. E/CN/4/1987/17/, Annex). 
66 De Schutter et al. (2012), preamble. 
67 For instance, the Commentaries refer to the ICJ judgments in Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004) and Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v Uganda (2005), both specifically relating to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
14 
 
scope of this circumstance, noting that ‘[b]ecause this element of foreseeability must be present, a 
state will not necessarily be held liable for all the consequences that result from its conduct’,68 
nevertheless the Commentaries are notably lacking in state practice to justify jurisdiction in such 
context. Relying on dicta from international human rights courts and tribunals, it seems eminently 
true that there are situations in which States should – and must – promote and support the fulfilment 
of socio-economic rights of other populations in how they act, even where they are not in territorial 
or effective control. But what seems eminently true does not per se make it legally binding. One 
might, for instance, think of how national foreign aid programmes should be operated in a way to 
promote particular objectives (or, in reverse, not to apply it in a discriminatory manner); we might 
even argue that States have a duty of due diligence to have considered such issues in developing 
their programmes. But as a matter of jurisdiction, is international law sufficiently advanced to 
develop a proposition that the ‘foreseeable effects’ of such actions brings with it obligations? A 
legally binding good neighbour principle, as it were, writ-large? 
Similarly, circumstance (c) imposes jurisdiction when a state (by itself or in concert) is ‘in a position 
to exercise decisive influence or to take measures to realize’ such rights. Again, this may seem 
unquestionable from a moral point of view;69 and to the extent that such obligations are tied to the 
general obligation on States under article 2(1) ICESCR to cooperate there is clear treaty support for 
it. Nevertheless ‘decisive influence’ as a concept here seems unduly wide in scope, building on 
notions on economic capacity and, what the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
sees as those states ‘which are in a position to assist others’.70 Moreover converting soft legal 
aspiration (as unfortunately many States see General Comments to be) into concrete legal obligations 
is a significant step. 
It is important to be clear what I am not saying here. I am not dismissing these Principles out-of-
hand. Nor am I suggesting they may not have a significant role to play. But rather to indicate the 
rather paradoxical linkage – and disconnect – from present international law. With all the best 
putative claims to international law, there is always significant coherence between new claims and 
the current law. Nevertheless, notwithstanding its foundation in binding human rights law, and the 
Principles own claim that they clarify the content of pre-existing law rather than being progressive 
development71 – there is such a chasm between where States now lie and what the Principles 
enunciate that one but cannot consider them as de lege ferenda in many important respects, however 
worthy they in fact do appear.   
The idea that States are under certain global responsibilities to ensure the human rights of all are 
protected and, in certain cases, fulfilled is not unreasonable, if however uncertain. The extraterritorial 
impact of policies and measures in the field of trade, investment and finance especially has long been 
recognised but little has been done to address the issues.72 The usual territorial limitations on jurisdiction 
and a general unwillingness to accept responsibility for anything other than the direct consequences for 
direct State action (and even then, as the jurisprudence on the jurisdictional scope of the European 
Convention on Human Rights has revealed, in a rather piecemeal way73) has left a rather substantial 
vacuum at the heart of human rights law.  
                                                          
68 De Schutter et al. (2012), p. 1109. 
69 Cf. French (2009) 600. 
70 CESCR (1990), para. 14. 
71 Nevertheless, see the discussion on variations in State acceptance of such obligations in De Schutter et al. 
(2012), p. 1094. 
72 See, for instance, the work of the Human Rights Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other 
related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly 
economic, social and cultural rights 
(http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/IEDebt/Pages/IEDebtIndex.aspx). 
73 See Milanovic (2012). 
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To that extent, the Maastricht Principles – of which a few more of its key provisions are set out below 
as mere exemplars of the scope of this ambition – invariably push forward an ambitious agenda of 
international obligations for both States and other international actors; or to use Alston’s phrase (though 
unconnected with this work) the ‘internationalisation of responsibility’. 
Principle 20. Direct interference 
All States have the obligation to refrain from conduct which nullifies or impairs the enjoyment 
and exercise of economic, social and cultural rights of persons outside their territories. 
Principle 21. Indirect interference 
States must refrain from any conduct which: 
a) impairs the ability of another State or international organization to comply with that State’s or 
that international organization’s obligations as regards economic, social and cultural rights; or 
b) aids, assists, directs, controls or coerces another State or international organization to breach 
that State’s or that international organization’s obligations as regards economic, social and 
cultural rights, where the former States do so with knowledge of the circumstances of the act. 
Of particular interest also in the Maastricht Principles is the recognition that where obligations exist, so 
does accountability (Principle 36) and the necessity of effective redress (Principle 37). Together, they 
form a set of principles which seek to take a significant stride forward in how seriously States should 
take their social and economic international obligations, both domestically and extraterritorially. 
Nevertheless, the Maastricht Principles are, at their heart, premised on traditional conceptions of human 
rights – recognising the singular importance of the individual and, in some cases, the group as the rights-
holder – even if their application ranges beyond the normal scope of jurisdiction ordinarily envisaged, 
or perhaps more accurately, accepted. As an attempt to move the debate away from the increasingly 
sterile conversations around third generational rights, for instance the human right to development, and 
towards effective implementation of what already exists, the Principles are to be considered an 
important step forward.  
For the purposes of the Global Goals, there is of course the fundamental issue of assimilation with 
human rights; are the Goals to be considered sufficiently equivalent to human rights to be equally 
worthy of extraterritorial protection? The Commentary to the Maastricht Principles is instructive on this 
point, referencing together – if not invariably equating – human rights and what it views as 
‘multilaterally agreed goals’, in this case the MDGs. 
The erga omnes character of human rights may justify allowing the exercise by states of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, even in conditions that might otherwise not be permissible, where 
such exercise seeks to promote such rights. Similarly, the realization of the MDGs is of interest 
to all states. Therefore, extraterritorial jurisdiction seeking to promote human rights, or the 
achievement of the MDGs, is not a case where one state seeks to impose its values on another 
state, as in other cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction.74 
Critics might rightly point to a too easy conflation of treaty-based rights and political targets to make a 
somewhat startling claim to a settled basis of jurisdiction.75 Nevertheless, it is without question that the 
                                                          
74 De Schutter et al. (2012), p. 1142. 
75 For a potentially interesting example of this already as regards the Global Goals and human rights law, see the 
2016 Concluding Observations on the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the UK’s fifth periodic report, in 
which rights under the relevant Convention and the Global Goals are grouped together. For instance, see para. 12: 
‘In accordance with article 4 of the Convention and Sustainable Development Goal 10, Targets 10.2 and 10.4, the 
Committee urges…’. 
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domestic and regional implementation of many of the Goals will be affected by the actions of a 
significant number of, especially the most economically powerful and developed States. What the 
Maastricht Principles raise is the question of whether we should begin to attach much more directly 
formal responsibility and legal accountability to such actions or what Principle 9 refers to as their 
‘decisive influence’. 
4.2. Global Solidarity as the Unspoken Ideal in Global Development 
The second re-imagining of the Global Goals through (a particular lens of) international law is that 
whilst acknowledging the benefits, but also the limitations, of a traditional human rights approach to 
development (as ultimately the Maastricht Principles seeks to present), it is also possible to view things 
at an even higher (more macro-) level. Of course, this is likely to encounter much (if not more) of the 
same criticism, mentioned above, namely: codifying aspiration, indeterminacy and conflating political 
choices and normative obligations. Nevertheless, if one is to query the structure of the status quo, there 
is perhaps scope for deeper contestation of that which we take for granted? Of particular interest is the 
work of the Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity,76 who has been working 
on a draft declaration on this matter to be put to the General Assembly. In its most recent formulation, 
international solidarity is defined as follows: 
International solidarity shall be understood as the convergence of interests, purposes and actions 
between and among peoples, individuals, States and their international organizations in order to 
preserve the order and ensure the very survival of international society and to achieve common 
goals which require international cooperation and collective action, based on the international 
normative system of duties which they implement and practise to foster peace and security, 
development and human rights. 
International solidarity shall be made evident in the collective actions of States that have a 
positive impact on the exercise and enjoyment of human rights by peoples and individuals within 
and outside of their respective territories, notably in the ratification of the United Nations 
international human rights treaties and international labour standards and the adoption of 
commitments and decisions agreed upon voluntarily between and among States at the regional 
and international levels.77 
There are, of course, some notable similarities with the work of the Maastricht Principles, especially 
the obligations on States to work towards the good of all ‘within and outside of their respective 
territories’. What is perhaps different is the purpose of that cooperation; not aimed at the attainment of 
individual rights per se but rather ‘to preserve the order and ensure the very survival of international 
society and to achieve common goals’. It is a view of the international community that is to some 
unfathomable, whereas for others it is intrinsic to the values and purposes inherent within the United 
Nations. It is high rhetoric, and unsurprisingly finds deep connections with much of the preambular 
references in Transforming Our World; ideas of co-existence, collaboration and common good. If the 
Maastricht Principles bends previous understandings of human rights obligations to promote new ideas 
of jurisdiction, responsibility and accountability, solidarity is undoubtedly more societally 
transformative in outlook. Whilst not undermining sovereignty – which is part of the paradox that 
solidarity invariably contains (how to protect and maximise domestic space whilst simultaneously 
seeking to achieve a common purpose?) – these ideas nevertheless reflect a fundamental challenge to 
the present order. 
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17 
 
More specifically, and for the purposes of re-imagining the normativity of the Global Goals this is vital, 
solidarity moves away from voluntarism towards a clearer sense of legal obligation and legal 
entitlement.  
International solidarity is a broad principle not limited to international assistance and cooperation, 
aid, charity or humanitarian assistance, and that it includes sustainability in international 
relations, especially international economic relations, the peaceful coexistence of all members of 
the international community, equal partnerships and the equitable sharing of benefits and 
burdens.78 
This is a call-to-arms to revisit structural privileges and entrenched poverty. The Draft Declaration sees 
as one of its fundamental principles as being ‘equitable, just and fair partnerships of States as the basis 
of international cooperation’.79 Placing the Global Goals in the context of international solidarity, one 
is thus immediately struck by some of the similarity in ideas and words. This is particularly with 
reference to Global Goal 17, which focuses on “Partnerships for the Goals” just as the final Millennium 
Development Goal, MDG 8 sought to “[d]evelop a Global Partnership for Development”. The targets 
associated with Global Goal 17 range widely but are broadly framed around finance, technology, 
capacity-building, and trade. Of course, international collaboration is to be found in all the Goals and 
not simply Global Goal 17. Particularly interesting are certain targets in Global Goal 10 (“Reducing 
Inequalities”) and Global Goal 16 (“Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”), which include, inter alia, 
targets on prioritising international aid, further implementing special and differential treatment for 
developing countries (particularly towards least developed countries) on matters of trade, and tackling 
illicit financial flows and corruption. 
Nevertheless, just as with MDG 8, the new goal of partnerships struggles with various innate tensions, 
arguably central to its attainment. First, how to balance global governance (‘enhanc[ing] global 
macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy coherence’80) with 
sovereign discretion (‘respect[ing] each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and 
implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development’). Secondly, reconciling the 
public and regulatory objectives of Global Goal 17 with the more limited capacity of States to “nudge” 
the private and corporate interests behind many of these pressures. And thirdly, how to understand the 
role of civil society, which is both promoted within the Global Goals and is curiously muted (invariably 
as a response to various countries’ domestic restrictive approaches to civil society involvement). It is 
within these tensions that the expected partnerships have already, and will continue, to operate. 
But there is a more fundamental tension at play here. There would seem to be a discordance between 
the targets set – however worthy – and the goal itself. In short, Global Goal 17, just as with MDG 8, 
can be viewed as operating on two very distinct levels; with each level rhetorically, but only 
superficially substantively, actually connecting. On one level, are the targets set; for instance on the 
transfer of technology, capacity building and debt sustainability. To the extent that these undoubtedly 
further the Global Goals, they are instrumental in identifying and giving effect to particular means of 
implementation. But what they are not, and what they do not achieve, is the second level, which might 
be referred to, more conceptually, as a global partnership properly-conceived. Such targets, however 
utile, are far removed from guaranteeing what the Draft Declaration refers to as ‘equitable, just and fair 
partnerships of States as the basis of international cooperation’ – and arguably in their random selection 
are even some way from the slightly less aspirational title of Global Goal 17 itself. In short, the targets 
of Global Goal 17 have little connexion to securing the structural global change envisaged by the 
ambitious idealism inherent within international solidarity. 
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80 Viewed as “Systemic Issues” under Global Goal 17. 
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This is not the first attempt, of course, where claims have been made to establish a stronger legal basis 
for international partnership. In addition to the intergovernmental moves to establish a New 
International Economic Order, the International Law Association sought to promulgate legal principles 
which might provide a basis on which such a new understanding of international law would operate. 
Some of these principles included well-established rules of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources and non-discrimination and other more aspirational notions of participatory equality, 
substantive equality and the principle of equity.81 Similar ideas are at the heart of the current work on 
international solidarity. As I concluded following a study of those principles, but it would seem to apply 
more generally to the theme of international solidarity;  
A sounder argument is to consider [such] documents…as containing useful pointers – if not, in 
some instances, also measurable signposts – towards the achievement of longer-term goals, in 
this case arriving ‘at a just balance between converging and diverging interests and in particular 
between the interests of developed and developing countries’, which must be considered 
foundational to the functioning not only of an equitable economic system but also, in the light of 
changing expectations, a sustainable international community, more generally. But being longer-
term makes such objectives no less important.82 
Nevertheless, realism is equally important. It is important to recognise that despite international 
solidarity having significant moral appeal, as a legal obligation much remains uncertain. Scobbie is 
particularly insightful when he notes: ‘Can a sufficient solidarity easily be assumed, or would the 
rejection of a Vattelian world-view risk the emergence of a (greater) world-anarchy? Even within 
territorial units, would social cohesion be maintained?’.83 Even if one were not to envisage crisis rather 
than harmony as the consequence of solidarity, progressive movement towards the goal requires 
confronting a conundrum as yet unresolved in international polity; ‘whatever autonomous normative 
authority (be it even of a rhetorical kind) one may believe international law to possess – it does not yet 
have a mandate to coerce states to accept that to which they do not voluntarily subscribe’.84 
 
5. Conclusion 
The Global Goals would seem to be a momentous achievement for the international community. First, 
they are an endorsement of an approach to development that the UN has finally found some global 
traction – with member states, partner institutions and socially aware private enterprise, building on the 
overall, though by no means absolute, success of the MDGs. Secondly, the Global Goals themselves 
are notable in several key respects; in their creation, in their scope and in their scale of ambition. The 
UN has an aspirational agenda of huge proportions over the next fifteen years; and, as noted above, 
unlike some of the MDGs which were achieved by proxy via improvements in GDP, most of the Global 
Goals are linked to more nuanced changes in policy, institutional structures and consumer and industrial 
behaviour.  There are arguably fewer “quick fixes” in the Global Goals.   
For the international lawyer, however, the Global Goals present something of a conundrum. They are 
not legally binding, nor are they written in legal text. They may, of course, involve changes, or require 
the implementation, of the law. But equally they may not. As noted above, law is often regarded as a 
fact – a fixed framework – through which the Goals must work; occasionally it might also be viewed 
as a useful tool. But in both cases, law is perceived in instrumental terms and for particular purposes. 
                                                          
81 ILA (1986), pp.1-11. 
82 French (2008), p. 32, quoting ILA (1986), p. 5. 
83 Scobbie (2005), p.312. 
84 French (2012), p. 701. 
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For those who want to envisage the Global Goals as having greater normative force in international law, 
the scope for discourse seems much more limited.  
Of course, the clearest way to view the Global Goals as international law would be to argue that they 
have, or are working towards, customary status. Certainly, arguments of a similar kind were made 
towards the MDGs. Regardless of whether that was true of the previous goals, I am simply unconvinced 
that this is possible for many of the Global Goals. Setting aside, at present, how far States will actively 
and consistently work towards making such Goals a reality (the “State practice”), I have little sense that 
one would be able to deduce acceptance from what States do or how they discuss the Goals (the “opinio 
juris”). For me, looking for customary status is an interesting endeavour, but unlikely to be productive. 
Moreover, Global Goals are not like those general principles of international law or norms of jus cogens, 
which are invariably upheld in treaties, official documentation and speeches, and thus is said to 
compensate for variable State practice. The prohibition on torture, for instance. Global Goals are 
overtly, and remain, in the political sphere. 
And for me, this also prevents an argument that such Goals are emerging as soft law. For proponents, 
soft law may appear a rather neat way to tackle the lack of present bindingness in the Global Goals, 
while still wanting to give them normative credence. But as I discuss, what makes soft law from a legal 
perspective is not per se the fact that it is official yet not binding, but that there is paradoxically an 
intention to regulate in the absence of law. Moreover, much soft law is on a journey to some form of 
“hardness”; it is invariably this transitional stage which makes soft law usable from a lawyer’s 
perspective. In respect of both of these criteria, the Global Goals fall down. They are neither designed 
to be regulatory nor is it particularly apparent that they are progressing towards bindingness. Thus, the 
question becomes what relevance the nomenclature of soft law, other than a neat (if unhelpfully 
generalised) categorisation?  
This leaves open a range of possibilities; to abandon law or to embrace alternatives. Above, the paper 
poses two re-imaginings – both putative in nature; developing the extraterritorial extent of the present 
law and, more radically, embracing a normative approach to international solidarity. As identified, 
neither are susceptible to providing easy solutions to global problems. Not only because they raise 
questions of positive law – which is surely inherent in the nature of a re-imagining – but also because 
they can be questioned as to how practicable they might turn out to be. For developed States, in 
particular, where voluntarism determines much development activity, it is extremely unlikely that either 
more expansive interpretations of pre-existing obligations (Maastricht Principles) or a more holistic 
account of global partnership (international solidarity) will find favour. Nevertheless, what both do – in 
their own way – is to force us to question the relevance of international law in the pursuit of 
development. Why is international law not viewed as an acceptable conduit and process for 
advancement of global development? International lawyers are still some way off from formulating – 
and persuading others of – a convincing response to this question; and perhaps we need to do this before 
we enter into our own (often internal and self-referential) dialogues of which of the differing “routes” 
to legality are found to be the more persuasive. 
But in being cautious moving forward, let us not reject such re-imaginings as the stuff of childish things. 
As Allott has so forcefully argued: 
we found within ourselves another capacity, the capacity to form the idea of the ideal — the idea 
of a better human future which we can choose to make actual…To overcome the tyranny of the 
actual, to overcome the ignorant and infantile belief that the actual self-organising of humanity 
is necessary and inevitable, we need only recall and recover our extraordinary power constantly 
to re-conceive the ideal, in order yet again to choose to make it actual.85 
                                                          
85 Allott (1999) p. 50. 
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